1. Recall from Section 1.3 that Matching Pennies (a static game of complete
information) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but has one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium: each player plays H with probability 1/2
Player2
H T
┌──┬──┐
H │1,-1│-1,1│
Player1 ├──┼──┤
T │-1,1│1,-1│
└──┴──┘
Provide a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a corresponding game of
incomplete information such that as the incomplete incomplete information
disappears, the player' behavior in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium approaches
their behavior in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the original game of
complete information.
2. http://www.wretch.cc/album/show.php?i=wwwpppjjj&b=32764&f=1411333389&p=2
題目在相簿裡
麻煩幫我解一下這兩題好嗎
第一題我自己的想法是要用Harsanyi轉換，但我不曉得 (T,H) (H，T) 是否需要轉換
第二題我可以畫出樹狀圖，但是後來就不知道要怎麼解了
請大家幫幫我吧 拜託~
--
information) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but has one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium: each player plays H with probability 1/2
Player2
H T
┌──┬──┐
H │1,-1│-1,1│
Player1 ├──┼──┤
T │-1,1│1,-1│
└──┴──┘
Provide a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a corresponding game of
incomplete information such that as the incomplete incomplete information
disappears, the player' behavior in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium approaches
their behavior in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the original game of
complete information.
2. http://www.wretch.cc/album/show.php?i=wwwpppjjj&b=32764&f=1411333389&p=2
題目在相簿裡
麻煩幫我解一下這兩題好嗎
第一題我自己的想法是要用Harsanyi轉換，但我不曉得 (T,H) (H，T) 是否需要轉換
第二題我可以畫出樹狀圖，但是後來就不知道要怎麼解了
請大家幫幫我吧 拜託~
--
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